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BOOK REVIEWS
By Charles Warren. Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, 1928. Pp. ix, 832.
When our law school was on Independence Square and we studied the
Constitution within a few feet of the rooms in which it was framed, we could
easily picture to ourselves the days when independence was declared, when
Congress struggled on until it was stoned from the city and when Washington, Franklin and others spent the hot summer months in preparing a new
scheme of government. Today the students have no such constantly inspiring
surroundings. But we may still walk through Independence Hall; we may
read the sketches which members of the Constitutional Convention wrote of
their associates; and in the Library of Congress we may hold in our hands
the manuscript of the elaborate notes which Madison wrote for posterity after
each session of the Convention and see the enshrined Constitution itself. We
may know the members of the Convention and their doings as well as we
may know any gathering of men who have since passed to the unseen shore.
It is of that Convention that Warren writes. He tells us nothing of the
origin of many of the provisions of the Constitution, such as the high-handed
doings under Charles the Second which led to the passage of the habeas corpus
act, an act which passed only because the tellers jestingly counted a fat lord
as ten and failed to correct their figures; or such as the throwing of the
Russian ambassador into jail for a private debt, an act which brought England
to the verge of war and was expiated only when Queen Anne sent a warship
to Russia with a message of apology; or such as the discussions in the Long
Parliament which led it to claim the right to enact ordinanceshaving the force
of laws without the consent of the king, although laws would not be valid without such consent, a contention which our Constitution takes pains to meet.
Many of the provisions of our Constitution originated long before the Convention assembled. But with those origins The Making of the Constitution does
not deal. The story begins on Sunday, May 13, 1787, as definitely as another
story of creation begins on the eve of a Sunday in the year 4oo4 B. C.
Day after day for four months the author takes us through the secret
sessions of the Convention, telling us all that Madison, Yates, King and others
recorded in their notes, giving us Washington's own account of the manner in
which he spent his evenings and Sundays, quoting the guesses and comments
of outsiders on the work which was going on behind closed doors, and, to a
considerable extent, showing how the provisions which were drawn up during
those months have fared in the courts. So full is his account that before we
are through with it we share somewhat in the growing impatience of the delegates, and are quite readV for the farewell dinner and the homeward journeys.
And yet only a few of these eight hundred pages might be omitted to advantage.
Any one who wants a shorter story may well read Beck's vivid account of the
framing of the Constitution and its ratification, or the small books of Schuyler
and Farrand, which give us fewer details of the Convention but more of its
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background. But Warren's chronicle will be quite useful to those who have
mastered the shorter accounts and want to read Madison's story as helped out
by the notes of other members of the Convention and by some references to the
later history of the provisions which were framed in 1787.
The reader who is familiar with the period knows that the Articles of Confederation possessed more merits than are here attributed to them; that the
book presents a merely one-sided statement of the contemporary attitude towards
judicial control ;1 and that the members of the Convention were less representative than appears from the book; and that because of their attitude towards
popular government, they devised a system which would quite possibly have
been unworkable without the growth of party government which they
did not contemplate. So also the author gives inadequate recognition to the
legislative history of the country, as in his treatment of the making of
appropriations for objects of public welfare which are not enumerated in the
Constitution. Such appropriations have been made from the earliest times;
without them it would be impossible to carry on the activities of the Department of Agriculture or most of the activities of the Department of Commerce;
and except as to one recent law they have not been challenged in the courts.
It was only when Congress attempted to save the lives of women and children
by grants of money to the States under the maternity law that such appropriations were attacked in court. Fortunately for the country, nothing came of the
attack and countless lives are still being saved each year by the very moderate
expenditures of which the author disapproves.
Exceptions might also be taken to the author's treatment of some of the
members of the Convention. For example, Gouverneur Morris, who spoke more
frequently and more foolishly than any other member, who was a fluent speaker
but a trickster according to his own statements and according to the testimony
of more trustworthy witnesses, is treated with more respect than his usual opponent in the debates, George Mason, one of the country's ablest statesmen, a
man who helped greatly in the framing of the Constitution, and whose merits
are too often ignored because the decisions of the Convention in its last few
days caused him to oppose the ratification of its work.
But while the book must be used with caution because it is less complete
than may appear to an inexperienced reader, and because some of the opinions
expressed in it seem not well founded, the author has gathered together a
large amount of material which is valuable to any one who is seeking a detailed
story of the Constitutional Convention. While this material is, in general,
chronologically arranged, the author departs from this plan to very good advantage at times in order to present in one place the history of a provision
which was discussed on more than one occasion. It is to be regretted that only
five pages are given to indexing the eight hundred pages of text. The book
goes into the history of the Convention in much more detail than any one would
suppose from a glance at the index.
Robert P. Reeder.
Washington, D. C.
'Cf. NEVINs, THE AMERICAN STATES, 1775-1789 168.
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By Felix Frankfurter and James M.
Landis. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1927. Pp. ix, 349.
This book is noteworthy for its novel plan, its significant though small
beginnings in the execution of such a plan, and its startling conclusions.
The plan is perhaps best stated in a footnote which deserves to be brought
out to the light. "Our national history," say the authors, "will not have been
adequately written until the history of our judicial systems can be adequately
told through monograph studies of individual courts. . . . Nor shall we be
able to know how our courts function until an effective system of judicial statistics becomes part of our tradition. . . . A very modest beginning has
been made by Mr. Ernest Knaebel, the Reporter of the Supreme Court, in
giving 'A Summary Statement of Business of the Supreme Court.' See e.g.,
265 U. S. 599. But a much more detailed analysis of the business of the
Court is needed if we are to have what might be called a social audit of our
political institutions comparable to the financial audit of our business institutions." '
The execution of the plan does not really include the statistical work
that the authors put forward as desirable. The pages are, to be sure, replete
with figures, but for the greater part of the period studied adequate figures are
unavailable, and the available figures must have seemed to the authors hardly
worthy of statistical handling. Thus, they make no "corrections!' or adjustment in their figures of the growth of the Court's business by reference to the
growth of population or the increase of jurisdictions or jurisdictional subjects,
or the average pendency of a case, or the like. They take no cognizance of the
lag in reaching the court of last resort of matters that have to go through
long preliminary stages in court or out before they reach the Supreme Court.
There are, to be sure, numerous indications in the book of what a statistician
would have to read into or out of the figures before they could be expected to
speak for themselves; but the statistical work has not been done, and the figures
as they stand are likely to be misleading.
What the authors have done painstakingly is quite a different task. Essentially, their book up to the last chapter is a legislative history of the Supreme
Court-a legislative history that includes bills not passed, agitations outside
of Congress behind the inception of each bill and, incidentally and generally
in the form of the arguments of the proponents and opponents of the bills,
contemporary evidence as to the working of the Supreme Court both as a
unit and as a part of the federal judicial system. Of course, such evidence
is fragmentary. It talks more of the occasional failures of the system than
of its normal workings. Furthermore, it talks more of external, impersonal
matters than of those more intimate affairs into which legislation does not
enter. For example, there is very little as to the actual organization of the
Court, the manner in which it has at various times discussed cases and taken
votes, and how the writing of opinions has been apportioned. Some of this
information, although by no means all, could have been gathered from a
study of the rules of the Court promulgated from time to time. But there
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is only one allusion to the rules of court,' and that has to do with the
workings of the statutory Conference of Senior Circuit Judges which is interesting to the authors chiefly for its legislative proposals. But even the legislative history is not fully utilized; for example, the subject of judicial salaries
-which certainly has not been devoid of interest or effect-is quite overlooked.
Other types of evidence as to the workings of the Supreme Court, such as a
study of the history of the Supreme Court Bar, the biographies of the Justices, the types of briefs filed and of arguments heard, the very different intellectual settings in which opinions have been written and the differences in the
style and type of opinion resulting at different times, might have been used;
but the authors apparently were determined to see what conclusions could be
based on more purely objective evidence as to the business of the Supreme
Court.
Out of the sources thus voluntarily limited through intensive use they
have succeeded marvelously well in deriving a connected story-and possibly
a moral, too. Again and again the growth of the country, the increase of
wealth and business, the expansion of the federal powers, the increasing paternalism of our government, the increasing complexity of our civilization,
and related causes have increased the work of the Supreme Court until its
efficiency was threatened. Relief was demanded and tardily, grudgingly, given.
Once it was the cutting down of circuit duties; now and then it was the addition of a judge; again, it was the shutting off or restricting of channels through
which cases could come up for review. Each measure of relief has had in it
something of a compronise, and each has been followed in turn by an
avalanche of new business unforeseen at the time of the compromise. "Perhaps," say the authors, "the decisive factor in the history of the Supreme
Court is its progressive contraction of jurisdiction!"' This factor has kept
it capable of doing its work efficiently so as to be able to win and retain
the confidence of the pubic. It would be foolish, however, to imagine that
the problem of keeping it efficient is solved forever now that it has caught
up with its schedule under the benign act of 1925 with its restricted obligatory
review accompanied by a wide discretionary jurisdiction.
The authors turn in their last chapters to this problem of the future. "In
future," they say, "when the Court's business expands, relief can hardly come
from further contraction of the right to resort to the Court."' Instead they
suggest a new analysis of law with an apportionment of such cases to the
Supreme Court as will make it in the European sense (i. e., questions of constitutionality and like matters of national importance) a tribunal for "public
law" as distinguished from the staple business of the common law courtsin other words, they want the Supreme Court to be a sort of "Privy Council."
Such a radical departure from our judicial traditions may at first sight
seem like a rather abrupt conclusion to an objective historical treatise on the
business of the Supreme Court. But a second perusal suggests that the
authors may have had such a conclusion in mind from the beginning and that
2
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there is something of the art of the advocate in withholding it until the end.
The ground, coming to think of it, has been carefully prepared. The limitation of the work of the Court is first demonstrated to be a recurring necessity.
The contraction of jurisdiction by the ordinary methods is shown to have
reached its limit. As to practically all other proposals the authors have prepared the way to the declaration, "These proposals have been canvassed in
the past and found wanting."' We are now ready for their constructive
proposal, which is promptly softened by the assurance that the Supreme Court
has already within the history recited ceased to be a common law court and
that it has, itself, recognized in one way or another that its business is
different from the "common run of litigation.'
It is now proposed that it
be closed entirely to those whose rights happen to involve nothing outside
of this "common run of litigation."
The authors have done a brilliant piece of work in making clear one of
our major national problems. And the service rendered is none the less significant though some may regard their proposal not as a solution but as a warning of what might happen to our liberties if we relax in our eternal vigilance.
Nathm Isaacs.
Harvard Graduate School of Business.

PoLnIc." By Thomas Hobbes. Edited
with a preface and critical notes by Ferdinand T6nies, Ph. D., to which
are subjoined selected extracts from unprinted MSS. of Thomas Hobbes.
University Press, Cambridge, 1928. Pp. xviii, 195.
The above work is one of the reprints which make up the Cambridge
English Classics series, in which is included also an edition of Hobbes' Leviathan. It is a new impression of Mr. T6nnies' edition of 1889, which, published by Simpkin and Marshall, and largely destroyed in a warehouse fire,
has been unobtainable for many years.
The story of the writing and publication of this book forms an intertesting chapter in the bio-bibliography of Hobbes. Although not printed until
165o and therefore not the first of his published works, it was written in i64o,
and is consequently the earliest statement of a doctrine which was inherent in
his three-fold system of philosophy and was the ground plan of his Levithan.
In 1637, Hobbes returned to England from his third sojourn on the Continent,
and entered the family of the Earl of Devonshire. England was soon in a
turmoil of political controversy over ship-money exactions and the Scottish
Prayer-book. Charles, finally, in April, 164o, found it necessary to relinquish
autocratic control and to call the Short Parliament. Seeing in that Parliament, says Hobbes, that the peace of the country and the safety of the king
were endangered by attacks on the royal prerogative, he wrote "a little treatise
in English," upon the power and rights of sovereignty, of which, "though
not printed, many gentlemen had copies, which occasioned much talk of the
author; and had not his majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought
him into danger of his life." This "little treatise" was identified by Prof.
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND
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Robertson and by Dr. T6nnies as The Elements of Law, the original manuscript of which is preserved in the Hardwick papers. The known copies of
the original are enumerated by Dr. T6nnies in the preface to the reprint
under review.
In x65o, Hobbes put into print two duodecimo works which have respectively the following titles:
(1) Human Nature: or the fundamental Elements of Policie; being a Discoverie of the Faculties, Acts and Passions of the Soul of Man, from
their original causes, according to such philosophical principles as are
not commonly known or asserted.
(2) De Corpore Politico: or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politick,
with Discourses upon several Heads; as the Law of Nature, Oathes
and Covenants, Severall kind of Government; with the Changes and
Revolutions of them.
These two books were made up from the manuscript Elements of Law above
described. Human, Nature contains the first thirteen chapters of the first division
of the original treatise. The remaining six chapters of that division stand as
Part I of De Corpore. Part II corresponds with the original second division
of the whole work. The book before us disregards these works of 165o and
restores the material to its original form of i64o.
Of a book, the content of which has been known and discussed since 164o.
and which was printed in its present form in 1889, little need be said. But it
is significant that at the present time, when the foundations of law are being
re-examined, this book should be reprinted. It deals with those things upon
which, so Hobbes thought, law is based, and devotes only one chapter of five
pages to the technical subject of the nature and kinds of laws. Part I deals with
men as natural persons, their faculties (sense, imagination, reasoning, speech,
knowledge, opinion, belief, good and evil, honor and the passions), the condition of men in nature, natural laws, and the necessity of a body politic. Part
II deals with the body politic, the kinds of government, sovereignty, religious
freedom, rebellion and the duties of sovereigns.
His approach to his thesis was like that of the modernists, whatever one
may say about the conclusions that he reached. He treated moral and social
phenomena as a naturalist would, and paid practical attention to the guidance
of human conduct. The object of his system was to gain power over things
for human needs. There is a hint of behaviorism in his denial that speech
came because man had reason, and in his assertion that "man became capable
of reason because he invented speech."
The first part of this book, on Human Nature, which critics have declared
to be the best of his compositions, justifies the remark of Pogson Smith that
Hobbes' style is something quite unique in English literature. Certainly it holds
one's interest as few seventeenth century treatises do.
The two pieces appended to the Elements have interest only to the student
of the whole field of Hobbes' philosophy. They deal with his theories of motion and of optics.
Frederick C. Hicks.
Yale Law School.
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FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTicE, June 15, x927-June 15, 1928. Publications of the Court, Series E-

No. 4. A. W. Sijthoff's Publishing Co., Leyden, 1928. Pp. 548.
To those who are interested in the work of the so-called "World Court,"
but who have not the time or inclination to follow its documentary history or
even the texts of its opinions and judgments, the Annual Reports afford a most
valuable guide and reference book. They are prepared by the Registrar and,
though they "in no way engage the Court," they are accurate and complete.
The arrangement of materials follows a uniform plan. Chapter i generally
deals largely with matters of personnel. Here one may find the names of
the regular and ad hoc national judges; the composition of the Special
Chambers; the list of Assessors; details of salaries and of the Court's premises. This year it also contains important material on the question of the
diplomatic privileges and immunities of the members of the Court, a question
which had been the cause of considerable friction with the Netherlands Government. The result has been the according to them of the usual privileges
of diplomatic officials.
The second chapter deals with the Statute and Rules of the Court. Here
one finds the list of States who support the Court-States popularly called
"Members of the Court" though this term properly belongs to the judges.
On June 15, 1928, fifty-two States had signed the Protocol of Signature of
the Statute and of these, forty had ratified.
Of the twelve which have not
ratified, nine are Latin American States and another is Liberia; the adherence
of the United States might influence action by these governments. Here
also is to be found an important addition to Article 71 of the Rules of the
Court whereby national judges are given a seat for advisory opinions as in
contested cases. This marks one more step in the steady process of assimilating the procedure for advisory opinions to that in actual suits between States.
The report of the Special Committee on this revision of the rules merits careful reading.
Chapter iii deals with the Court's jurisdiction. Here is an outline of
the scope of the Court's activity. The picture is impressive. Twenty-seven
pages are devoted to a listing of international treaties giving the Court jurisdiction; forty-seven new treaties of this type were concluded in the year
ending in June, i928, an excellent indication of the Courts increasing prestige. One also finds in this chapter details regarding the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, including the status of the Optional Clause which has
been signed by twenty-seven States. Data on the American Senate's reservations are also included here. Other chapters deal with the Court's finances and
its publications, and include two chapters of Addenda to lists and materials
appearing in the earlier reports.
Chapters iv and v are the most important to one who really wishes to
cvaluate the work of this international tribunal. These chapters contain summaries of the eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth judgments and of the
fourteenth and fifteenth advisory opinions. The introduction to this chapter
also notes four contested cases and one request for an advisory opinion referred to the Court but not disposed of when this report went to press. These
include the Sino-Belgian dispute submitted by unilateral application under the
Optional Clause-the first of such applications. This case has since been
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disposed of by direct adjustment and the conclusion of a new treaty. The other
three cases all involve France and relate to disputes with Switzerland, Brazil
and Serbia. The last two involve the practical problems of payment of government bonds.
It is impossible here to go fully into the details of the cases disposed of
by the Court in the twelve months covered by the Report, but a brief mention may indicate the type of problem which the nations of the world are adjusting through this judicial instrumentality.
Judgment No. 8 decided a dispute between Poland and Germany regarding the indemnity due for a German factory in Chorzow, Upper Silesia, which
was taken over by the Polish Government. In a prior judgment the Court
decided against the Polish contentions regarding the propriety of the expropriation. The new dispute involved the amount of indemnity claimed by
Germany. The case was brought to the court by Germany under the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the German-Polish Geneva Convention of 1922.
Poland filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court. This plea was overruled and the Court reserved the case for judgment on the merits. The judgment was adopted by ten votes to three. The German Government thereupon
asked for an order granting interim protection, but this request was denied by
the Court. The Eleventh Judgment was an interpretation of this and of the
prior judgment relating to the same facts.
Judgment No. 9 is in some respects the most noteworthy that the Court
has rendered. Most of the cases referred to it have rested upon the particular
terms of treaties; this case called for a decision on the basis of general principles of international law. The Lotus case, as it is called, involved a collision
on the high seas between the French mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier, Boz-Kourt, resulting in the sinking of the latter and the death of eight
Turks. The French officer in charge of the Lotus was arrested when he put
into Constantinople, tried for manslaughter and found guilty. France contended that the Turkish courts had no jurisdiction in the premises. By special
agreement the case was referred to the Permanent Court. A Turkish national
judge ad hoc was appointed, thus making a bench of twelve judges. The
judgment was adopted by the casting vote of the President of the Court, the
votes being equally divided; in such a situation the President has two votes.
The majority held that Turkey had violated no rule of international law in
taking jurisdiction, the prevailing theory seeming to be that of the localization
of the offense, i. e., the taking effect of the crime on a Turkish ship which
is assimilated to Turkish territory. judge John Bassett Moore concurred in
part of the majority opinion but dissented on other grounds. The six dissenting judges all delivered separate opinions, many of them being of great interest. The case demands the closest study by any one interested in general principles of international law and theories of state jurisdiction.
Judgment No. io involved the case of the Greek Mavrommatis concessions
in Jerusalem, a case formerly twice before the Court under the Palestinian
Mandate Treaty wherein Great Britain accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court for certain matters concerning the mandate. In this third appearance of the case, the British plea to the jurisdiction was sustained by
seven votes to four.
Judgment No. 12 was also a dispute between Germany and Poland, this
time involving a controversy regarding German minority schools in Polish
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Upper Silesia. Poland again pleaded to the jurisdiction and was again overruled. On the merits, the judgment, which was adopted by eight votes to
four, in general, supports the Polish contentions.
The fourteenth Advisory Opinion related to the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, while the fifteenth concerns the jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. The former case, especially, was of great importance to Europe generally. The latter opinion was delivered unanimously
and from the former, only the Roumanian Deputy-Judge, M. Negulesco, dissented.
It is impossible to do more here than to indicate, by what precedes, the
extent and utility of the work of the Court. It is fortunate that the Court
has had the advantage of the services of so able a person as M. Hammarskj bd, who has been Registrar since it came into existence. Not only the
excellent Annual Reports, but the whole notable documentation of the Court
may be attributed to him.
Philip C. Jessup.
Columbia University.
AracwA'- LAw MADE PLAIN.
St. Louis, x928. Pp. 155.

By George W. Logan.

Von Hoffman Press,

Many of us are interested in aeronautics. Most of us are interested in
aviation. All of us are interested in flyers and flying. Newspapers and magazines present all kinds of aviation activities. Law reviews and legal periodicals
contain many articles on the legal aspects of this most recent development. All
of these articles, however, tend to be somewhat philosophical or highly theoretical. There was an opening for a more popular treatise.
After having read, as he states, "every printed word on the subject which
could be found," Mr. Logan, of the St. Louis Bar, has presented a most
interesting and compact volume written in a pleasant and easy style. Although
"written especially for those interested in aviation as prospective craft owners,
uperators, investors and students," the book should be a worth-while addition
to any law library.
Each chapter heading is a question which is answered by the text, supported by citation of authorities in the foot notes. These are: Where may
I fly? Who may regulate me or my plane? What are my liabilities? What
effect will riding in or operating an airplane have on my insurance? Where
will cases be tried arising out of air crimes, air-made contracts, wills, marriages,
etc. ?
All questions are answered logically, reasonably and courageously. Due
deference is given the legal writings, maxims and leading cases; but where
modem development and present day circumstances makes agreement unreasonable, the author does not follow blindly or attempt to reconcile. For example,
in answer to "What are my liabilities ?" it is stated, "You are liable as operator, or as owner, for all damages done to persons or property on the ground
irrespective of your negligence, unless the accident was due to the negligence
of the injured person" with a footnote stating that, "This is legal heresy,
a new theory."
The stimulating originality of the volume, its courageous disregard of
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settled legal formalisms, when they appear unreasonable, and its ground work
of common sense are best illustrated by some additional quotations and some
excerpts from the text. "The application of the [ad coelum] maxim has been
exaggerated; it was not intended to fly that high." As "lawyers, like night
watchmen prefer to do no more work than necessary," the practical difficulties
incidental to preparing and conducting suits against the owners and operators of
individual aircraft will lead to a rule of law imposing liabilities for nuisance,
if the facts so warrant, upon the owners or operators of the airport from
which the individuals fly. "The writer joins with Dean Bogert of the
Cornell Law School in his opinion that a federal act, taking exclusive jurisdiction over all aviation, would be sustained by the United States Supreme
Court." It is to be regretted that the United States has not entered into the
Air Convention of igig with the twenty-two nations that have adopted it. As
to liability for collision between airplanes or aircraft, the common law rule
is preferable to the admiralty rule where, each being negligent, the loss is evenly
divided. "In spite of this weight of authority, it still seems that the word
'participating' (in insurance policies) will not long remain sufficient to include
persons riding as passengers only." The words hazardous, dangerous and participating as used in insurance policies and applications "are likely to assume
a different and less serious definition as transportation by airplane widens
its scope and appeal." "As one author has said, the air ship opens a new field
for crimes and a new field for criminal law." "A hydroplane apparently is
neither fish nor fowl," being subject to common law rules at times and to
admiralty jurisdiction at other times. "If a word of advice may be pardoned,
it would be suggested that an airplane is no place in which to execute a contract.
For a while, at least, it might be well to forego novel experiences in contract
making and have them drawn with time and care and caution on the ground,"
"marriages, like contracts, should be entered into on the ground."
The volume ends with a digest of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the
Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, and digests of the statute law of the
several states pertaining to aeronautics.
Perhaps the title, Aircraft Law Made Plain, may prejudice some lawyers.
So also flyers may object to the use of "aeroplane" instead of the correct and
modern term "airplane," to "hydroplane" for "seaplane" and may also point
out that there are "pilots" but no "operators" of aircraft But the book is
quite different from the pamphlets on "Wills," "Real Estate," etc., occasionally
compiled and distributed by trust and insurance companies for the benefit of
the public. As well as being pleasing, and of value, to any person interested in
the operation of aircraft, it should possess the same attributes for the lawyer,
for the former, after reading it, will be more likely to consult the latter than he
would have been before so doing.
Harold F. Mook.
Erie, Pa.
Oxford University
Press, New York, i928. Pp. 248.
Timeliness of the matter treated in the British Year Book of International
Law, 9z98, is its most outstanding feature, and its clarity and thoroughness of
treatment are also quite impressive. In these respects it is like most of its
THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1928.
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eight predecessors. The reviewer well remembers his impression of the first
issue of this series of books, published in i92o. In was lying on the library
table of Admiral Stockton, himself an authority on international law. The
reviewer had then but lately returned to civil life from service in the Navy
which had brought him into touch with the convoying of the belligerent merchant
ships at sea, with neutral ships and commerce, and with their legal rights
and duties. The feeling then current was that international law had broken
down, that old customs long thought to be fixed had fallen before the new
tools and new ways of warfare. International law as a bulwark of civilization was regarded as a broken reed rather than as a sure foundation.
In that frame of mind the reviewer picked up the British Year Book of
International Law, z92o-2i and read about British Prize Courts and the War.
Submarine Warfare, The Peace Treaty in its Effects on Private Property,
and the Legal Position of Merchantmen in Foreign Ports and National Waters,
and as he read these clear statements of the rules of law he remembered, as
clearly as he did the boatswain's pipe, how scrupulously all the rules of international law had been observed on board the ships on which he had
served during the war, and how, when a breach of the law was charged
against one nation or another, that nation had taken particular pains to
justify itself by the very law which it had been accused of breaking. Before
one can say that the law has broken down, one must know what the law is.
The thought is made clear in the introduction to that first volume:
"The war has left in the minds of many people the belief that
international law is a thing of the past, and therefore it behoves all
those who believe that it is still a living force to work for that 'firm
establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual
rule of conduct among Government'
. .
as a means of achieving international peace and security."
All the articles in that first volume were very timely in that they dealt
with the law in cases where men were doubtful whether the law had not
been disregarded, if not wholly cast aside, and they were attempts to show
what the law is.
The present volume is equally timely in also dealing with the law involved in present-day questions of importance. For instance, everyone knows
of the recent failure of Great Britain and the United States to agree upon
the basis of limitation of naval armament. The wedge which split them
was the question of the rights and the duties of neutrals. The same subject
prevented agreement as to privateers in I856. The same subject led to difficulties between Great Britain and the United States in x915-i6. And the
current Year Book deals with various phases of the same question in articles
upon Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession, The Treatment
of Mails in Time of War and The Pre-War Theory of Neutrality.
Another current matter is raised by recent legislation in the United
States providing for the return to former alien enemy owners of certain
property taken from them by the alien property custodian during the war.
Judge John Bassett Moore in his Internationw Law and Some Current Illusions refers to a rule of law to the effect that the private property of alien
enemies may not be confiscated but must be returned. On this side of the
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Atlantic that rule has been generally respected.
After the Great War,
however, alien private property was taken by European states by way of
reparation for war losses. A decision by Chief Justice Marshall in the
early history of America,1 sustains that right as inherent in a sovereign government. Whether it is better to invite foreign investment by respecting
private property even in wartime, or to make good, out of alien property,
losses sustained in a war against such aliens, is a question of policy on which
there is room for difference of opinion. What the law should be is open for
discussion. But what is the existing rule? Once it is ascertained, discussion
upon its amendment becomes more helpful. The article upon this supiect in
The British Year Book of Intematiotal Law, International Law and the Property of Aliens, stays properly within its field in examining the authorities and
principles and in stating what the rule is.
There is still another instance of timeliness. At this writing there is a
treaty being discussed in the United States Senate, and many Americans are
wondering whether the conduct of our foreign relations is not seriously hampered by the "intervention" of that branch of the legislature. The current
Year Book has a very illuminating article, When Do British Treaties Involve
Legislation, which shows a tendency on the part of the British Parliament to
come closer to the American practice.
This is not a book for one in search of general information upon foreign
relations and foreign policy. It is a law book for those who wish to study the
rules of law as applied between nations. And the rules of law discussed are
rules applicable to present problems still unsettled. The attainment of the
"firm establishment of the understandings of international law" is made much
more probable by the existence of this volume and its eight predecessors.
Philadelphia, Pa.

Charles Chauncey Savage, Jr.

THE LAW OF BUILDING AND USE RESTRIcTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA. By Spencer Ervin. Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, 1928. Pp. xliv, 36z.
The law of building and use restrictions has grown up in comparatively
recent times, and is still in a formative state. Yet with the great diffusion of
wealth in the United States since the war, restrictions have been imposed upon
almost every piece of land that has been put into use for urban and suburban
residence. Ground developers and home buyers seek restrictions constantly
broader and more inclusive. At the same time, and for the same reason,
neighborhoods change more and more speedily and restrictions then tend to
become clogs rather than benefits, and their removal or avoidance becomes
a problem. It seems likely, under such circumstances, that the law will develop
very rapidly, and like all creatures developed over-quickly, will, unless carefully
guided, become misshapen, and full of almost ineradicable deformities. The
necessary guidance must come primarily, of course, from enlightened courts.
The necessary enlightenment cannot be -obtained from the decided cases,
viewed merely as precedents, nor from an encyclopedic digest of such cases.
'Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch IIo (U. S. 1814).
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Mr. Ervin, in his preface, indicates a purpose to supply this lack fcr this
state; to point out to the bench and bar the problems which are arising in
connection with this development, and the underlying theories upon which they
should be solved.
Such an ambitious attempt, to be effective, must of course be based upon
a thorough analysis of the decided cases. This the author realizes, and his
discussions of the cases both from the Pennsylvania courts and those of other
jurisdictions are illuminating. To the real meaning of these decisions must
be added the inferences to be drawn from them, or logically derived from
them. In drawing these inferences the author has sought outside assistance
only from the Law Reviews. Not the least valuable feature of the work is the
copious citation of articles and notes from the Reviews. From these materials
has been constructed a complete view of the subject of building and use restrictions from which certain deformities in the present law are apparent
and certain unfortunate tendencies indicated. The obvious criticism, that an
effort definitely to mark boundaries in advance has a tendency to straitjacket the law, while just when applied to judicial decisions or to restatements of the law, seems unjust to a treatise such as this one, for such a work
is valuable in proportion as it points the definite line.
A treatise, unlike most other law books, should be capable of being read
as a whole. Mr. Ervin's book easily meets this requirement For this purpose
it is perhaps overburdened with long discussions of certain possible but practically unused methods of creating restrictions. But, this obstacle surmounted,
the reader will find many interesting discussions, shot through with common
sense. Particularly suggestive are the discussions of auxiliary use and
companionate use, of the entire subject of the availability of the benefit of
restrictions, of inaction as a defence to enforcement, and of the validity of
restrictions against transfer to or occupancy by persons of a specified race
or religion, as affected by the interaction of the rule against restraints upon
alienation and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The
latter is perhaps the most significant subject discussed, and throws grave
doubt upon the generally assumed validity of such restrictions.
Among the chief merits of the work' from the view point of the practitioner are several summaries of the law, and certain forms and valuable suggestions for drafting restrictions.
Gerald F. Flood.
Philadelphia,Pa.
EXPLANATORY

OUTLINE OF THE FUNCTIONS AND

REQUIREMENTS OF BANKERS,

TRUSTEES, REGISTRARS, TRANSFER AGENTS AND LAWYERS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ISSUE OF INVESTMENT SECURITIES. By William D. Eaton. Financial Publishing Co., Boston, 1928. Pp. 67.
There is an increasing multitude of details requiring attention in this
present day in connection with the issue of investment securities. At the same
time the demand is becoming more insistent for rapid action in the planning
and launching of such issues. However broad an experience the banker or
broker may have had with work of this character, there is always present
the necessity of devoting much time to the examination of the conditions re-
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lating to each particular issue in order that no important detail may be
overlooked. Sufficient time for such careful planning and examination is not
easily obtained in the hurry of a business day. A number of excellent books
dealing with corporate financing and corporate trusts are available and are a
great help in obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the subject and in
supplementing the personal experience of those having charge of some phase
of the work. Such books, however, are not readily adaptable either to the
rapid planning of investment issues or to the subsequent checking up of the
numerous items requiring attention. It is an important requisite of those
jointly engaged in such work that there should be quick and intelligent cooperation among them to complete the work in the least possible time and
with an assurance of accuracy. It is evident that each member of the
several groups should bring to the subject a ready comprehension not only of
his own work but also of the other groups concerned.
The considerations mentioned should assure a welcome to Mr. Eaton's booklet outlining and summarizing the functions and requirements of those occupied with such tasks. The booklet, in its introductory chapter, calls attention to the general scope and purpose of the outline with reference to the
respective functions of each of the agencies involved, and points out the
necessity of a clear understanding by each group of the functions and requirements of the other groups so that their work may be properly co-ordinated
and helpful co-operation obtained. After outlining the facts to be determined
generally, there are separate chapters detailing the requirements of each of the
groups concerned in the issuance of the various forms of securities. Under
each chapter there are divisions and subdivisions treating the subjects in their
logical sequence. A special chapter treats briefly of the issuance of securities
in corporate readjustments and reorganizations. The outline concludes with
summaries comprising an advance check list of action to be. taken and relevant
facts and a closing check list.
No doubt each of those whose business it is to participate in work of this
character has in some form or other made up or adopted a list or outline from
which to check off compliance with the requirements. It is likely, however,
that the booklet here reviewed treats the subject in a more thorough manner
and may be used to advantage either by itself or in conjunction with such
other lists. The use of Mr. Eaton's outline would be helpful as a chart or
plan in preparing and carrying to completion the various details involved in
the issuance of new securities. When so used the reviewer suggests that additional saving of time cotuld be obtained by further subdividing the subject in
one or more of several ways as, for example, by treating stock issues alone
in one outline and issues of corporate obligations in another, or by the use
of one outline to cover secured obligations and another to cover those which
are unsecured. Although this would involve the repetition of details common
to all issues it would also serve to eliminate a number of items not requiring
attention in the issues separately treated so that the information necessary in
any particular issue under examination would be more quickly available.
Frank T. Matthews.
Philadelphia,Pa.

BOOK REVIEWS
PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL

REPUBLIC.

By Johannes Mattern, Ph.D. The Johns Hopkins Press, Balti-

Pp. xv, 682.
The Johns Hopkins University could not have better celebrated the fiftieth
year of its existence than by publishing this book, an elaboration of lectures
more, 1928.

which Dr. Mattern delivered at the University during "the winter semester of
1924-1925. I wish he had said Law instead of Jurisprudence,because he means
law, and I, for one, was misled by his title; but there is little else with which the
most inveterate disposition to carp could find fault in this solid, serious and
exhaustive presentation of one of the most important developments of modern
public law.
The German Republic was born in war and revolution. There were many
voices then-there are many now-which declared the offspring not to be viable.
The breach between the old order and the new was enomous, far greater than
we ordinarily realize. The German Empire of 1871 was something unique. The
special conditions of its development, fully set forth in this volume, produced a
type of government which was not in any proper sense a parliamentary scheme,
although many externals of parliamentary government were present. Nor in
spite of its federal character, was it in its functioning and regulation more than
superficially like other federal organizations such as the United States or Switzerland. So, when the Weimar constitution created a system which in its political
machinery was essentially like that of England and France, and which equally
bore unmistakable evidence of American influence, it could reasonably be asserted, as the eminent Romanist, Otto Lenel, did,' that neither the parliamentary
model of England nor the party model of the United States had any roots in
Germany.
And yet, wide as the chasm was which the year i919 created for German
Constitutional growth, Dr. Mattern rightly emphasizes the continuity of that
growth. This is a matter of no small moment and makes possible an adaptation
of the new order to German predispositions, the very predispositions Lenel
sought for and declared lacking. To be sure, to create a conceptual pattern for
this adaptation often demands no slight logical ingenuity, but fortunately for the
author and for Germany, this ingenuity has been amply exercised for generations. If it is a question of formulas that can be scientifically interrelated, there
is nothing essentially new in the newer formulas. So, for example, a half dozen
principalities in Central Germany were in i919 amalgamated into a new state,
Thuringia, which again is a creation of a larger state-the German Reich-of
which the old principalities formed a part just as the new one continues to do.
This is complex enough for incurable dialecticians, but after all no more complex than the formulas which pre-war orthodox publicists created to express the
vicissitudes of, let us say, the duchy of Lauenburg, once independent, then a part
of Brunswick in i689, of Hanover in 1705, of Westphalia in 1807, of France in
18io, of Denmark in 1815, which was jointly governed by Austria and Prussia
in 1864, in 1865 was bound to Prussia by a personal identity, its sovereigns, and
finally was annexed by Prussia in i876. This omits some minor vibrations of
sovereignty. A public law that has survived problems of this sort, must have
developed a technique which is not easily daunted by revolutions.
1
LENzL, DAs A11ERIIANISCHE REGERUNGSSYSTEM (Strassb. Wiss. Gesellschaft, Heidelberg, n. f. I922) 2o.

724

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

But it is the newer problems of Germany which form the real subject of the
volume. They were complicated by political disturbances of the most serious
character-rebellion, threats of secession, coups d'etat, foreign pressure and a
disastrous economic crisis. Germany is not, even now, living under peace conditions. But it is more and more approaching those conditions, and when Dr.
Mattern wrote, the course which German constitutional law seems to be taking
was already indicated. Inevitably American experience will be repeated to some
degree. But it is not in the least likely that the most difficult of our constitutional problems will present themselves with anything like the same force to
German officials. Economic and personal regulation is a simpler and more
familiar matter to Germans than to us.
The task of delimiting powers and adjusting conflicts in administrative and
legislative machinery will loom largest for the present, and they are fully discussed in this book. It remains to be seen whether or not the Reichsgericht will
develop to the full its almost inevitable function of umpiring these conflicts.
Unmistakable steps have already been taken in this direction.2 But the larger
questions will probably not arise fully until a situation of complete economic
readjustment has been reached. Those large questions concern the disintegrating impulse presented by Bavarian nationalism, by the renewed Kulturkampf in
connection with education and by the tendency to syndicalism on the part of the
trade unions. But there is no reason to believe that these cannot all be solved
within the present constitutional framework.
One of the most interesting experiments is that of the introduction of the
referendum on a scale certainly unprecedented in history. Dr. Mattern gives us
a full account of it in his chapter xii, which is an expansion of an older study,
issued by the Johns Hopkins Press in i92o. And in setting forth the most notable instance of a referendum, that of i926, concerning the expropriation of the
former German princes, he presents a curious illustration of the principle that
political devices can always be met by other devices. In order to avoid the
enactment of important laws by a handful of voters, it was provided that a general referendum shall be lost if the total number of votes cast should be less than
half the number of duly qualified voters. The qualified voters in the referendum
of 1926 numbered 39,686,848. Under normal circumstances, even in elections
which engage public interest, it is rare that more than two-thirds of possible
electors participate. Now, in this election, the Monarchical supporters, foreseeing defeat at the polls, resorted to the simple device of deliberately abstaining,
and a campaign was conducted in the press to that effect. The result was that
fourteen and a half million votes were cast for the bill and only a half million
against it. The total was less than half and the measure was lost. If the Conservative elements had mustered their full strength, they might perhaps have
cast ten million votes against it, which would have been a distinct minority, but
nevertheless would have brought up the total to far above the half required.
That a piece of democratic machinery could be utilized by a minority to defeat
the will of the majority is a bit of political irony with which we are not unacquainted, and speaks well for the ingenuity of German politicians.
Max Radin.
School of Jurisprudence, University of California.
I Cf. FRiTZ FRlEs, DIE RiCHTE.LcHE NACHPRfTFUNG
LUDWIG ADAmOWIcH, PRf1FUNG DER GESETZE

(Erlangen 1926);
(Wiener Staats. Stud. i924).

